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The NASA COTS (Commercial Orbital Transportation Services) Program was a very 
successful program that developed and demonstrated cost-effective development and 
acquisition of commercial cargo transportation services to the International Space Station 
(ISS). The COTS acquisition strategy utilized a newer model than normally accepted in  
traditional procurement practices. This new model used Space Act Agreements where NASA 
entered into partnerships with industry to jointly share cost, development and operational 
risks to demonstrate new capabilities for mutual benefit. This model proved to be very 
beneficial to both NASA and its industry partners as NASA saved significantly in 
development and operational costs while industry partners successfully expanded their 
market share of the global launch transportation business. The authors, who contributed to 
the development of the COTS model, would like to extend this model to a lunar commercial 
services program that will push development of technologies and capabilities that will serve 
a Mars architecture and lead to an economical and sustainable pathway to transporting 
humans to Mars.  Over the past few decades, several architectures for the Moon and Mars 
have been proposed and studied but ultimately halted or not even started due to the 
projected costs significantly exceeding NASA’s budgets. Therefore a new strategy is needed 
that will fit within NASA’s projected budgets and takes advantage of the US commercial 
industry along with its creative and entrepreneurial attributes. The authors propose a new 
COTS-like program to enter into partnerships with industry to demonstrate cost-effective, 
cis-lunar commercial services, such as lunar transportation, lunar ISRU operations, and cis-
lunar propellant depots that can enable an economical and sustainable Mars architecture. 
Similar to the original COTS program, the goals of the proposed program, being notionally 
referred to as Lunar Commercial Orbital Transfer Services (LCOTS) program will be to: 1) 
reduce development and operational costs by sharing costs with industry; 2) create new 
markets in cis-lunar space to further reduce operational costs; and 3) enable NASA to 
develop an affordable and economical exploration Mars architecture. The paper will 
describe a plan for a proposed LCOTS program, its potential impact to an eventual Mars 
architecture and its many benefits to NASA, commercial space industry and the US 
economy.  
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Nomenclature 
COTS = Commercial Orbital Transportation Services 
CRS = Commercial Resupply Services 
DAV = Descent/Ascent Vehicle 
DRA =  Design Reference Architecture 
EDL = Entry Descent and Landing 
ELA = Evolvable Lunar Architecture 
EMC = Evolvable Mars Campaign 
FAR = Federal Acquisition Regulations 
GER = Global Exploration Roadmap 
HEOMD = Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 
HSF = Human Space Flight 
ISECG = International Space Exploration Coordination Group 
ISRO = Indian Space Research Organization 
IMLEO = Initial Mass to Low Earth Orbit 
ISRU = In-Situ Resource Utilization 
ISS = International Space Station 
LCOTS = Lunar Commercial Orbital Transfer Services 
LCROSS = Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite 
LEO =    Low-Earth Orbit 
LH2 = Liquid Hydrogen 
LLO = Low Lunar Orbit 
LOI = Lunar Orbit Insertion 
LOX = Liquid Oxygen 
LRO = Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter 
MAWG = Mars Architecture Working Group 
MOI = Mars Orbit Insertion 
MTV =  Mars Transfer Vehicle 
NASA =  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NRC = National Research Council 
NTR = Nuclear Thermal Rocket 
OTA = Other Transaction Authority 
PSR = Permanently Shadowed Region 
PVA = PhotoVoltaic Array 
RESOLVE= Regolith & Environment Science and Oxygen & Lunar Volatile Extraction 
ROI = Return On Investment 
RPM = Resource Prospector Mission 
SAA =  Space Act Agreement 
SHAB = Surface Habitat 
SLS = Space Launch System 
TEI = Trans-Earth Injection 
TLI = Trans-Lunar Injection 
I. Introduction 
resident Obama’s 2010 National Space Policy1 established far-reaching exploration goals for NASA including 
human missions to Mars as explicitly stated in: “By the mid-2030’s, send humans to orbit Mars and return them 
safely to Earth”. This goal is further supported by the specific objectives in NASA’s 2014 Strategic Plan2 which 
states “Expand human presence into the solar system and to the surface of Mars to advance exploration, science, 
innovation, benefits to humanity, and international collaboration.” In response to these goals and objectives, 
NASA’s Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) continues to evolve plans, conduct 
trade studies and investigate architectures for transporting humans to Mars as described in the recent Evolvable 
Mars Campaign briefing3 dated April 2015.   
 Prior to the Evolvable Mars Campaign work, NASA’s Mars Architecture Working Group (MAWG) had 
developed a Mars Design Reference Architecture4 5.0 (DRA5) which was released in 2009. This reference 
architecture described all the systems and operations needed for transporting humans to Mars. It’s final two 
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architecture options (summarized in Section II) estimated that approximately 800 to 1200 metric tons of Initial Mass 
to Low Earth Orbit (IMLEO) was needed to transfer all the necessary crew, hardware, life-support equipment and 
propellant to the surface of Mars and allow return for each human mission. As will be shown in Section II, most of 
the mass of a Mars Transfer Vehicle is propellant mass, which is on the order of 50 to 60%. Therefore, to lift all this 
mass to LEO (where the elements would be staged and integrated), DRA5 estimated that 7 to 12 heavy-lift launch 
vehicles, in surges (launches very close together in time), would be needed per Mars campaign. Today, that NASA 
heavy-lift vehicle would be the Space Launch System (SLS). 
 This architecture also included major technology development challenges such as nuclear thermal rockets, 
aeroshell braking for Mars atmosphere, ascent/descent vehicles, ISRU plants, nuclear power stations, and a new 
upper stage and advanced boosters for the heavy lift vehicle, within a surge launch campaign concept. As a 
consequence, DRA5 resulted in very high cost estimates for its development and operational phases. Therefore, 
NASA’s Evolvable Mars Campaign and other groups continue to conduct trade studies, investigate various 
technology options and opportunities for international and commercial partnerships to achieve an affordable and 
sustainable Mars architecture. 
 Concurrently, a recent 2014 report by the National Research Council (NRC) entitled “Pathways to Exploration: 
Rationales and Approaches for a US Program of Human Space Exploration5” also concluded that the current human 
spaceflight program to develop launch vehicles and spacecraft for missions beyond LEO has “unrealistic and 
unsustainable mission rates well below any historical precedent.” The NRC estimated costs for the DRA5 
architecture with a targeted first human Mars landing in mid-2030’s is shown in figure 1, also from reference 5.  
 The NRC sand chart shows the total projected NASA Human Exploration & Operations budget (approximately 
$8B a year in 2015), both as flat and as adjusted for cost inflation, against the estimated costs for a DRA5-like Mars 
exploration architecture as well as estimated costs for other recommended exploration pathways such as, lunar sortie 
and lunar outpost. As clearly illustrated, the DRA5 architecture budgets and other exploration pathways far exceed 
even the most optimistic assumption of an HEOMD budget increasing on par with estimated cost inflation for this 
schedule-driven budget. 
 Furthermore, the NRC presented analysis of various approaches or pathways in its report to achieve the goal of 
human missions to Mars which they agree should be the ultimate goal of our national space program. They made 
several recommendations for implementing an affordable and sustainable program for human spaceflight beyond 
LEO. One of these recommendations stated:  
“it was clear to the committee from its independent analysis of several pathways that a return to extended 
surface operations on the Moon would make substantial contributions to a strategy ultimately aimed at 
landing people on Mars.”  
 They also recommended to “vigorously pursue opportunities for international and commercial collaboration in 
order to leverage financial resources and capabilities of other nations and commercial entities” and “continue to 
leverage commercial products and practices to strengthen the industrial base and increase NASA’s efficiency.” It is 
clear from these statements that the NRC finds great merit in returning to the Moon and leveraging from commercial 
space partnerships as much as possible to achieve an affordable and sustainable approach to reaching Mars. 
 
Figure 1. NASA’s HSF Budget including Mars DRA5 architecture as estimated by the NRC, Ref. 5  
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 Additionally, the International Space Exploration Coordination Group’s (ISECG) released their latest Global 
Exploration Roadmap6 (GER) in 2013. The ISECG represents numerous space agencies from different nations 
around the globe, such as, NASA, European Space Agency, Roscosmos of Russia, JAXA of Japan, ISRO of India, 
and the Canadian Space Agency. These participating agencies have collaborated to develop a coordinated space 
exploration roadmap for all the agencies to use in their domestic planning for a unified approach to exploration. The 
GER’s long-term goal is to enable humans to explore the surface of Mars in a manner that is affordable, sustainable 
and productive. Towards this end, the GER also recommended that a stepwise approach be taken to reduce technical 
risk and make progress towards meeting exploration objectives, such as in science and technology. After 
examination of several stepwise approaches, the GER concluded that a return to the Moon would be most 
advantageous and specifically stated: 
“With the goal of enabling several partners to contribute critical capabilities to future human missions, agencies 
note that near-term collaborative missions on the ISS, in the lunar vicinity, on the lunar surface and robotic 
missions may be used to simulate and better inform preparations for future international missions to Mars.”  
 The GER also noted that ISS cargo delivery services (that resulted from COTS and Commercial Resupply 
Services (CRS) Programs) have demonstrated the feasibility and success of public-private partnerships to create 
affordable space services and products. They also noted the importance of encouraging new services and economic 
markets to incorporate in future planning, as stated in, “With a large number of planned lunar robotic missions in the 
next decade, it is considered likely that logistic services to the lunar surface will become commercially available, so 
they are included in the mission scenario.” They also stress the importance of encouraging private sector 
investments by making long-term commitments as stated in, “For such private sector efforts to succeed they need 
the certainty of a long-term governmental commitment to space exploration.” Finally, they conclude that agency 
leaders must focus on delivering value to the public in order to build a sustainable human space exploration 
endeavor that lasts decades.  
Both of these reports (NRC and GER), and others7,8, have shown that in order to achieve affordability and 
sustainability, it is critical to embark on a stepping stone approach to demonstrate incremental successes and value 
to the public on our journey to Mars. It will become increasingly difficult and challenging to continue to garner 
support on such a costly and decades-long journey without showing tangible benefits to the public and/or the 
economy. These benefits may range from new consumer products, technological breakthroughs to new commercial 
services such as orbital tourism. A good measure of success will be substantial impacts to the economy by the 
addition of new markets, new products and services. Therefore it is imperative to engage and incorporate the well-
established and emerging space industries in the planning stages of an evolvable Mars strategy to ensure a 
sustainable and economical approach to Mars. 
A good example of spawning new commercial products and services from a NASA-sponsored program are the 
COTS/CRS programs. These programs were initiated to create commercial products and services at competitive 
prices to support the long-term, logistical cargo and crew transportation needs of ISS. To ensure competitive prices 
and emergence of new markets to further stimulate the economy, NASA entered into cost-sharing partnerships with 
industry via Space Act Agreements instead of the traditional cost-plus government contracts. By implementing this 
approach, or COTS model as will be explained in more detail in Section IV, NASA saved significantly in up-front 
development and downstream operations costs. In addition these programs resulted in the creation of new 
commercially available products (e.g. SpaceX’s Falcon 9 launch vehicle and Dragon spacecraft and Orbital’s 
Antares launch vehicle and Cygnus spacecraft) and services (commercial cargo delivery to ISS) that are critical and 
cost-saving components of the ISS program. Similarly, NASA should pursue a COTS-like acquisition approach to 
engage and integrate industry in its stepping-stone approach to an economical and sustainable plan to reach Mars.  
As recommended by the NRC and GER reports, a necessary stepping stone approach would be a return to the 
Moon as it has great potential for international and commercial partnerships as well as opportunities for 
development of capabilities needed for future Mars missions. As shown in many scientific findings and recent 
reports9,10, there are an abundance of valuable resources on the Moon, (such as, H2O, O2 and Al) that can be 
extracted or mined for commercial purposes (to be described more in Section III). Several studies11,12,13 have also 
shown that extracting these resources, such as water and oxygen, can be easily accomplished. Furthermore, the 
Evolvable Lunar Architecture (ELA) study, as described in reference 11, presented an affordable and economical 
plan for establishing a permanent commercial lunar base that can create and deliver up to 200 mt of propellant per 
year to cis-lunar space for a total estimated development cost of $40B over a 10-12 year period. If this plan is 
realized and lunar-derived propellant can be produced and delivered at economical rates, then this will have a 
dramatic impact to future human Mars mission concepts as the IMLEO without the propellant will be significantly 
reduced as well as the required number of heavy-lift launches, making future Mars concepts more affordable.  
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Therefore it is recommended that a potential LCOTS program be investigated to evaluate the potential benefits 
to future Mars mission concepts and value to the public for sustainability. As reported in the ELA study, 
development of an affordable, lunar commercial industrial base to create propellant will have far-reaching benefits 
beyond enablement of an economical and sustainable pathway to human missions to Mars. If a lunar commercial 
base to support NASA’s missions is realized, then this will spur the emerging space industry to create new cis-lunar 
markets and businesses which will result in tremendous impacts to global economy, national security, and US global 
leadership and the emergence of a new era of lunar colonies and human habitation on the Moon. 
II. Summary of Mars Architecture 
The Mars Design Reference Architecture (DRA 5.0) has been widely accepted as the reference architecture for 
transporting humans to Mars since its release in 2009. It was developed by NASA’s Mars Architecture Working 
Group (MAWG) to fulfill NASA’s need for updated and unified reference architecture for human exploration of 
Mars. As a result, this architecture describes in detail the systems and operations that would be used for the first 
three human missions to explore the surface of Mars.  
Figure 2 illustrates the concept of operations for this architecture as shown in reference 4. In summary, two 
cargo Mars Transfer Vehicles (MTV’s) are launched in components, assembled (via rendezvous and docking) in 
LEO and sent on a low-energy Mars trajectory from an approximate 407-km circular orbit that will take 
approximately 9-12 months to reach Mars orbit. These cargo MTV’s will deliver the Surface Habitat (SHAB) lander 
system, Descent/Ascent Vehicle (DAV), aeroshells, nuclear power system, ISRU plant, several rovers and other 
hardware and equipment needed ahead of crew arrival. Once in Mars orbit, the DAV performs an entry, descent and 
landing (EDL) maneuver to land its payloads up to approximately 40 mt to the desired landing site. Once on the 
surface, the surface fission reactor would be deployed to begin ISRU operations. This unit will then autonomously 
begin production of propellant for the ascent stage needed for human return to Mars orbit. The second cargo MTV 
carrying the Habitat Lander or SHAB will wait in Mars orbit until the crew MTV arrives.  
Approximately 2 years after the cargo MTVs are launched, a crew of six will be launched along with its crew 
MTV which is also assembled in LEO. The crew MTV performs a TMI maneuver which places it on a shorter 
duration (approximately 6 months) transfer to Mars than the cargo MTV. Once in Mars orbit, the crew will transfer 
to the SHAB via the Orion crew capsule and descend to the surface. The crew will then stay on the surface for 
approximately 18 months performing exploration and scientific studies. They will then return to Mars orbit via the 
Ascent Vehicle where it will rendezvous with the crew MTV, perform a TEI maneuver and return to Earth. 
 
 
Figure 2. Mars Design Reference Architecture 5.0 from Reference 4, NASA SP-2009-566 
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Figure 3. DRA5 Mission Sequence timelines from Reference 4, NASA SP-2009-566 
The DRA5 set a minimum of three human missions for this architecture for several reasons including 
development time and cost to achieve the basic capability and time required to accomplish the basic program goals. 
These missions were planned to occur on three consecutive trajectory opportunities approximately every 2 years. 
Figure 3 illustrates the mission sequence timelines for two of the three missions as planned for the DRA5 
architecture. 
Two in-space propulsion options were presented in DRA5: a nuclear thermal rocket (NTR) stage and advanced 
chemical propulsion stage. The NTR common propulsion stage uses a fission-reactor-generated thermal power and 
consists of three 25-klbf NTR engines. The advanced chemical propulsion option was based on RL10-B2 engines 
supplied by LOX/LH2 propellant. The number of engines for each stage varied from 5 engines for the TMI module 
to 2 engines for the TEI module. Although the NTR engine was a lower TRL technology propulsion option of the 
two, it was selected as the preferred approach for DRA5 due to its high thrust (10’s of klbf) and high specific 
impulse (Isp 875–950s) capability using hydrogen propellant which is twice that of today’s LOX/LH2 chemical 
rocket engines. 
Figure 4 shows a more detailed view of the crew and cargo MTVs with NTR common propulsion stages. Table 1 
presents a summary of the major elements with its estimated mass listed for each. As shown in the table, the 2 cargo 
MTVs and 1 crew MTV sum up to a total of approximately 800 mt of IMLEO for each human mission to Mars.  
 
Figure 4. Crewed and Cargo MTVs based on NTR propulsion stages 
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Table 1. Mass estimates (from Ref. 4) for major elements of Cargo and Crewed MTV for the NTR Option 
 
Also it is worth noting from Table 1 that a total of approximately 356 mt of LH2 propellant is needed to support 
all the stages of the 3 vehicles on its trajectory to Mars from LEO. The 140-metric-ton-capacity Ares V launch 
system concept was assumed for delivering these elements to LEO. The number of Ares V launches varied from 7 to 
9 in DRA5. A report by Borowski14 concluded that a total number of 7 Ares V launches were needed for the NTR-
based vehicles: 4 launches for the cargo MTVs and 3 launches for the crewed MTV. 
Another report by Holladay15 analyzed several more heavy-lift options for launching all the necessary Mars 
elements to orbit. An interesting finding showed that only 4 Ares V launch vehicles would be necessary if the 
propellant was separated from the Mars elements and delivered to a LEO propellant tanker by existing commercial 
launch vehicles. This analysis was conducted using the advanced chemical propulsion option for the stages. Table 2 
lists the estimated mass for each major element including the LOX/LH2 propellant needed. For this commercial 
launch option, a total of 650 mt of propellant was estimated to be needed in orbit every 2 years to meet the cadence 
of missions planned for DRA5. This total showed that 54% of the IMLEO needed for the MTV’s consist of 
LOX/LH2 propellant. This scenario represents an excellent opportunity for a commercial market to emerge and 
supply the propellant needed at a more cost-effective rate than provided by heavy-lift launch vehicles. There have 
been several studies16,17 that have investigated commercial propellant depots in LEO as well as in cis-lunar space, as 
discussed previously in the ELA study, to capture this market. Section VIII below will provide an economic 
assessment for a cis-lunar propellant depot as well as discuss the benefits for developing such a capability. 
Table 2. Mass estimates (from Ref. 4) for major elements of MTVs for the Adv. Chemical Propulsion Option 
 
Cargo	Mars	Transfer	Vehicle	
(Note	all	masses	are	in	metric	tons)	
Mass		 Crew	Mars	Transfer	Vehicle	 Mass		
NTR	common	propulsion	stage	(includes	87.2t	of	
LH2	prop)	
133.2	 NTR	common	propulsion	stage	(includes	87.2	of	
LH2	prop)	
139	
Surface	Habitat	(SHAB)	lander	system	including	
nuclear	power	system,	and	2	small	pressurized	
rovers	
103	 LH2	drop	tank	and	long	saddle	truss	(includes	94t	
of	LH2)	
124	
Descent/Ascent	Vehicle	(DAV)	system	includes	ISRU	
plant,	nuclear	surface	power	plant,	drill	and	2		
unpressurized	rovers	
103	
	
Payload	includes	6	crew,	Transit	Habitat,	short	
saddle	truss,	2nd	docking	module,	2	Orion/Service	
Modules	
64	
Total	IMLEO	for	each	Cargo	MTVs	includes	prop	 236.2	 Total	IMLEO	for	Crewed	MTV	includes	prop	 327	
Total	LH2	prop	for	2	cargo	MTV’s	 174.4	 Total	LH2	prop	for	1	crewed	MTV	 181.2	
Total	IMLEO	for	2	Cargo	MTVs	and	1	Crew	MTV	 ~800	 Total	LH2	prop	for	2	Cargo	MTVs	and	1	Crew	MTV	 ~356	
Cargo	Mars	Transfer	Vehicle	
(Note	all	masses	are	in	metric	tons)	
Mass		 Crew	Mars	Transfer	Vehicle	 Mass		
Surface	Habitat	(SHAB)	lander	system	including	
nuclear	power	system,	and	2	pressurized	rovers	
103	 Transit	Habitat	Module	includes	6	crew,	short	
saddle	truss,	2nd	docking	module,	2	Orion/Service	
Modules	
~100	
Descent/Ascent	Vehicle	(DAV)	lander	system	
includes	ISRU	plant,	nuclear	surface	power	
plant,	drill	and	2		unpressurized	rovers	
103	
	
TEI	and	MOI	stages	 125	
Empty	TMI	Stage	 30	 3	TMI	Stages	 90	
LOX/LH2	Propellant	for	each	Cargo	MTV	 192	 LOX/LH2	Propellant	for	TMI	stages	 ~250	
Total	IMLEO	for	each	Cargo	MTVs	includes	prop	 325	 Total	IMLEO	for	Crewed	MTV	includes	prop	 565	
Total	IMLEO	for	2	Cargo	MTVs	and	1	Crew	MTV	 1215	 Total	LOX/LH2	for	1	Mars	Mission	every	2	years	 ~650	
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In summary, Mars architectures to date have been characterized by: 
 Large need for propellant to LEO which makes up most of the mass for a mission to Mars; 
 Long development times and large budgets needed to mature technologies and demonstrate capabilities in a 
space environment; from habitation to landers to stages; to ISRU capabilities; 
 Need for staging of mission elements in LEO, before departing to Mars, opens the possibility of 
commercial propellant delivery separate from the space systems elements.  
III. Lunar Resources and ISRU Capabilities 
Knowing that the Mars missions need such large amounts of propellant that may be delivered separately, all 
possible resources, such as the Moon, should be investigated as an option for delivery of these resources. The 
question naturally arises: Would it be possible to extract, process and deliver these resources from the Moon 
economically? To answer this question, it is important to first review and understand the resources available on the 
Moon followed by investigations on how to perform ISRU on the surface of the Moon economically. 
There have been several remote-sensing, lunar missions in the last two decades searching for evidence of water-
ice in the permanently shadowed regions (PSRs) of the moon. These missions included DOD and NASA’s 
Clementine mission launched in 1994; NASA’s Lunar Prospector mission launched in 1998; ISRO’s Chandrayaan-1 
launched in 2008; and NASA’s Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) launched in 2009 with mini-RF radar 
instrument. All these missions provided some indirect evidence that the poles may contain water ice deposits. 
Furthermore, LRO’s mini-RF experiment results indicated that several hundred millions of tons of water may exist 
in the upper 2-3 m of the lunar surface at both poles18.  
The results19 from the earlier missions (Clementine and Prospector) were debated over a decade until NASA’s 
Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) mission was launched in 2009 (together with LRO) and 
intentionally navigated to impact the moon to provide direct evidence of water ice. The mission’s plan was to send 
both LCROSS and the attached upper stage, Centaur, on a trajectory to impact the Cabeus crater in the south pole 
region of the moon. On October 9, 2009, the Centaur crashed into that crater causing a huge debris plume as planned 
with LCROSS’ Shepherding spacecraft following a few minutes later, collecting and relaying data from the plume 
back to Earth.  The Shepherding spacecraft carried 9 instruments, including cameras, spectrometers and a 
radiometer. Results20 showed concentrations of water ice estimated at 5.6 + 2.9% by mass in the lunar regolith of 
this crater.  
Further studies21 have indicated that the cumulative areas of the PSRs of the northern and southern hemisphere 
total an estimated area of 31,059 km2. If all this estimated area contained water ice at the estimated levels provided 
by the LCROSS results, then the total quantity of water contained within the uppermost meter of all the PSRs would 
be 2.9x1012 kg (or 2900 million mt of water) as reported in reference 10.  
In addition to the presence of water, the LCROSS results indicated the abundances of other volatile species other 
than water as shown in the table below:  
Table 3. Abundances of volatile species from LCROSS results (Colaprete Ref. 20)
 
 These results confirm prior reports, as in references 9 and 10, which provide estimates for similar elements in the 
lunar regolith. Based on analysis of lunar samples brought back from Apollo missions, the major elements in the 
lunar regolith include oxygen, silicon, aluminum, calcium, magnesium, iron, sodium and titanium. In addition, there 
are trace amounts of other important elements in the regolith including sulfur, phosphorus, carbon, hydrogen, 
nitrogen, helium, neon, argon, krypton and xenon as reported in reference 9. All these reports show that the Moon 
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has a wide range of resources. Furthermore these lunar resources can be exploited through ISRU capabilities to build 
infrastructure on the Moon and/or deliver to cis-lunar space for use in space exploration architectures to other solar 
system destinations. 
 There have been several studies, as cited previously in references 9-13, examining the opportunities and 
challenges for developing ISRU capabilities and performing ISRU operations on the Moon. It is generally agreed 
that it would be very beneficial to develop ISRU capabilities to learn to “live off the land” for future human 
exploration missions and eventual colonization. If we are to explore other worlds, advanced planning tells us that it 
is best to take advantage of the resources existent in other worlds instead of transporting all the resources and 
consumables needed for such long and distant journeys. Being capable of relying on critical ISRU capabilities for 
any human exploration concept can have several potential impacts to mission design, mission performance, mission 
assurance and life-cycle costs. In addition, ISRU operations have the potential for spawning numerous opportunities 
for commercial involvement and lunar markets, thus creating a cis-lunar economy capable of sustaining itself. 
 However, before ISRU capabilities and operations can flourish, there needs to be extensive prospecting for 
resources, testing and experiments conducted on the lunar surface to determine if ISRU in reality can be 
economically feasible. Initially, ground truth data must be obtained to determine the properties of the lunar regolith, 
location  and distribution of volatiles, quantities of hydrogen and water, and accessibility of resources. From the 
scientific data obtained to date, all indications are that there are vast amounts of water in the lunar poles. The PSR of 
the poles may be very challenging to operate in. Some of these challenges include illumination, temperature ranges, 
rough terrain and direct communications to Earth for robotic operations. There will need to be several missions to 
various sites near the poles and the equators to prospect for resources and identify the hazards to access these 
resources.  
 To date, there have not been any ISRU experiments or tests performed on the Moon or any other solar system 
body. Currently, there are projects in development including Resource Prospector Mission22 (RPM) and Mars 
Oxygen ISRU Experiment23 (MOXIE) that plan to test different techniques for oxygen extraction on the Moon and 
Mars, respectively. More specifically, RPM plans to land a rover in the vicinity of the lunar poles and traverse up to 
1 km prospecting and drilling for resources. RPM plans to carry the Regolith & Environment Science and Oxygen & 
Lunar Volatile Extraction24 (RESOLVE) payload consisting of a number of instruments to determine the type and 
quantity of volatiles and then heat the samples to make water. This will be a challenging mission and critical first 
step for developing and demonstrating ISRU capabilities on the Moon. Currently, RPM is in the formulation phase 
with tentative plans for launch by 2019 as stated in reference 22. 
IV. Best Practices from COTS/CRS Programs 
Before launching into description of a potential Lunar COTS program, it is essential to review best practices 
from the COTS and CRS programs to understand its acquisition approach, its benefits and challenges and how to 
apply it to a new program. 
The COTS Program was formulated by a very small team (including 2 of the authors) at NASA Headquarters’ 
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate in 2005. The goal of this formulation phase was to develop an alternate 
commercial option to stimulate industry to develop low-cost, ISS crew and cargo transportation services, in parallel 
with the traditional acquisition efforts that were currently underway for the Ares I and Crew Exploration Vehicle 
projects for ISS under the Constellation Program. This alternate option focused on taking advantage of a “non-
traditional” acquisition strategy which would leverage NASA’s Other Transaction Authority (OTA) under the Space 
Act as a mechanism to invest resources into the emerging space industry to develop and demonstrate new 
capabilities. This non-traditional acquisition strategy was a dramatic departure at the time from traditional FAR-
based procurement contracts, such as cost-plus or firm-fixed price contracts. 
 The OTA is a contractual instrument but very different from the FAR-based contracts which contain lengthy and 
in some instances burdensome and restrictive FAR clauses. Instead, the elements and clauses of an OTA are very 
streamlined and ungoverned by the FAR and have been characterized by starting with a clean sheet of paper and 
regulated by a set of mutually agreeable terms and conditions. Under this OTA, NASA elected to enter into funded 
Space Act Agreements (SAAs) with COTS participants to stimulate industry to develop capabilities and demonstrate 
eventual services needed by NASA. It was clear that this strategy would allow much more flexibility to the 
emerging space industry participants which were the targeted group, without being encumbered with the full 
administrative and reporting requirements traditionally required by FAR contracts.  
 Although NASA would have less technical oversight and reviews using this approach, the programmatic and 
technical risks were reduced by employing pre-negotiated, pay-on-performance milestones within the SAAs. Using 
this strategy, NASA would only provide funding for the participants after successful completion of  performance or 
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financial-based milestones ensuring deliberate progress being made towards final demonstration of the capability in 
the flight environment. Also under this strategy, NASA was not expected to fund the total cost of development since 
in the final outcome NASA would not own the intellectual property rights nor own or operate the service(s). Instead 
the COTS participant or commercial space provider would be expected to raise its own investment funds and share 
the development costs with NASA. Therefore the SAAs were, in essence, establishing commercial space 
partnerships which were defined as mutually beneficial relationships where both parties make a strategic and 
resource investment to jointly share cost, development and/or operational risk to create new capabilities or services 
for mutual benefit.   
Another important tactic used in the COTS solicitation was to require the commercial space providers to include 
feasible and economical business plans in their proposals. It was expected that the providers would be targeting 
markets outside of NASA and not solely rely on the government to close their business case. This tactic was used to 
force the providers to develop low-cost capabilities to capture new markets, expand their customer base and create 
new industries to further commercialize LEO space.  
Also from the onset of COTS, it was planned that multiple providers should be selected to increase competition 
and reduce risk to the program. Since this was a high-risk, high-payoff acquisition approach, it was important to 
have multiple providers in case one failed to meet its milestones, then it could quickly be replaced by another 
provider without much penalty in contractual fees. This was another important advantage to using SAAs over FAR-
based contracts. The SAAs offered multiple off-ramps through the use of its performance-based milestones. If too 
many milestones were missed making evident that not enough progress was being made, then NASA could 
terminate the agreement without much penalty, thus reducing risk to the program.  
During implementation of COTS, this exact scenario turned out to be the case for one of its participants, 
Rocketplane-Kistler (RpK). In 2006, two participants, SpaceX and RpK were selected to enter into SAAs with 
NASA under COTS. Early on in the development phase, RpK missed a few financial-based milestones which 
indicated to NASA their slow progress in raising the investment funds needed to reach their financial goals. After 
intense discussion with RpK and close inspection of their financial investment efforts, it was evident that RpK did 
not have a viable chance of raising the required funding. Therefore, COTS decided to terminate the SAA with RpK 
in 2007. They then quickly released another solicitation to select another participant to enter into a COTS SAA. As a 
result, Orbital Sciences Corp was selected in 2008 and successfully completed all its milestones with its final cargo 
transportation demonstration flight to ISS in 2013.  
Another important decision made during implementation of COTS was to award early on the ISS Commercial 
Resupply Services (CRS) contracts in 2008. The COTS formulation team originally planned for two phases leading 
to the eventual goal of NASA procuring low-cost orbital transportation services to transport pressurized cargo to 
LEO to meet NASA’s missions. The first phase would culminate in a demonstration of orbital transportation of 
pressurized cargo to LEO which was implemented during the COTS program. The second phase would procure 
these cargo transportation services through a traditional FAR-based services contract, named the Commercial 
Resupply Services contract which were issued by the ISS Program Office. The original plan included granting these 
service awards after successful demonstration of cargo transportation capabilities to reduce risk to the program. 
However, based on the commercial provider’s schedule for completing COTS and with the anticipated retirement of 
the Shuttle looming, there was an urgency to award these contracts sooner than later to close the gap within the ISS 
servicing schedule. Also the providers would need sufficient lead time after contracts were awarded to procure long-
lead items for their launch vehicles. Therefore, the decision was made to award the CRS contracts much sooner than 
originally planned. In retrospect, this decision helped make the first phase, COTS, a success as it showed a firm 
commitment by NASA to procure long-term cargo transportation services ensuring its COTS participants and 
investors a firm anchor customer in NASA. 
As a result of the COTS and CRS programs, 2 new launch vehicles and spacecraft were developed and have 
been successfully servicing the ISS program with cargo transportation missions: 1)SpaceX’s Falcon 9 rocket and 
Dragon spacecraft; and 2)Orbital’s Antares rocket and Cygnus spacecraft. Furthermore, SpaceX has revolutionized 
the global space transportation industry by significantly reducing space transportation costs for medium-class launch 
vehicles which is causing intense competition among the other launch vehicle providers. SpaceX also has plans to 
make the core stage of its Falcon 9 rocket reusable which if successful will further reduce its launch vehicle costs by 
a factor of 2 or 3. 
The COTS and CRS programs proved to be very successful by implementing a very effective model to lower up-
front development and operations costs of space transportation and in-space systems. A recent study25 conducted by 
NASA compared SpaceX’s actual development costs for the Falcon 9 (launch vehicle only) to estimated costs using 
traditional cost-plus methods under FAR. Using the NASA-AF Cost Model (NAFCOM), this study estimated that it 
would have cost NASA approximately $4 Billion to develop the same space transportation system using traditional 
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cost-plus contracting methods.  The actual development cost to NASA for the SpaceX Falcon 9 and Dragon was 
$443 million26, of which only $200M were for the Falcon 9 launch vehicle. This is a 2000% (or 20-to-1) reduction 
in costs over NASA’s estimated cost for the traditional approach. Even given the company partners private 
investment, estimated as another $200M for both launch vehicle and spacecraft, these metrics emphasize the 
dramatic affordability improvements possible using a commercial partnership approach. 
In summary, there are specific attributes or best practices of the COTS model which helped make it an 
impressive, cost-savings success. These best practices are summarized here again to emphasize their importance: 
1) NASA and commercial partners share cost, development and operational risk to demonstrate new 
capabilities for mutual benefit.  
2) NASA makes long-term commitments to procure commercial services to help secure private investments. 
3) NASA encourages commercial partners to target other markets outside Government to make their business 
case close. NASA is anchor customer but not sole customer. 
4) NASA uses SAA’s to enter into partnership with commercial partners to offer maximum flexibility in 
design solutions without the full demands and requirements of typical FAR-based contracts. 
5) NASA includes pay-on-performance milestones in SAA’s to provide several off-ramps and reduce 
programmatic risk. 
6) Commercial partners retain Intellectual Property (IP) rights and operates and owns final product(s). 
V. Proposed Lunar Commercial Orbital Transfer Services (LCOTS) Program 
In order to take advantage of the benefits of utilizing lunar resources, without encumbering NASA with the full 
cost and risk of developing these resources, the authors recommend to initiate an LCOTS program to enter into 
commercial space partnerships with industry, to share cost, development and operational risk and to incentivize 
industry to stimulate a cis-lunar economy. Thus the goal of an LCOTS program is to establish affordable, cis-lunar 
capabilities and services for mutual benefit. As with COTS, it is recommended that OTAs be leveraged and Space 
Act Agreements be used as the contracting mechanism between NASA and industry. As proven as a successful 
method with COTS, SAA’s offer industry the maximum flexibility to arrive at a design solution to meet the desired 
requirements. It also reduces programmatic and development risk to NASA as negotiated milestones are included in 
the SAA’s providing numerous off-ramps to NASA if milestones are not met. Further, as shown in the previous 
discussion, it is imperative to include in this acquisition strategy firm commitments by NASA to procure long-term, 
cis-lunar commercial services to guarantee industry an anchor customer to help close their business case. Following 
this COTS-like acquisition strategy, LCOTS will also encourage industry to target other markets including emerging 
new markets to make their business cases close so not to be solely dependent on its anchor customer. As the COTS 
program showed, this strategy in the long-term will dramatically improve affordability and push industry to create 
new markets and open new businesses thus creating a thriving cis-lunar economy which can eventually lead to an 
economical and sustainable pathway to Mars. 
The primary objectives of the proposed LCOTS program are to 1) demonstrate and enter into operation cis-lunar 
capabilities; 2) reduce technical and operational risk to Mars mission concepts; and 3) reduce life-cycle costs to 
Mars architectures. We envision the cis-lunar capabilities to include autonomous lunar landings, robotic prospecting 
for resources, extraction or mining of lunar resources, drilling for water beneath the surface and ISRU production of 
propellants, such as, LOX and LH2. In addition, cis-lunar infrastructure will need to be established to enable cost-
effective commercial services to emerge such as, nuclear or solar power plants, communication and navigation 
satellites, durable habitats for long-term crew stay, ISRU plants, reusable lunar landers to deliver lunar resources to 
cis-lunar space and propellant depots at cis-lunar space destinations, such as, Earth-Moon L1 or L2 or Lunar Distant 
Retrograde Orbits (LDRO).  
By partnering with industry to develop and demonstrate these capabilities, it will not only stimulate a cis-lunar 
economy but it will also reduce the technical and operational risk of developing similar capabilities needed for a 
Mars architecture. As discussed in Section II, the DRA5 architecture is dependent on ISRU capabilities to create the 
necessary propellant on the Mars surface for the return trip home. Also learning how to “live off the land” through 
ISRU activities, tele-operation of robotic systems, and development of long-term life-support systems will all be 
very beneficial to long-term human missions to the surface of Mars.  
To meet the third objective of an LCOTS program, i.e. to reduce life-cycle costs, it is important for NASA to 
show in the early stages of the program its intent of awarding long-term contracts for cis-lunar commercial services. 
If these services are well-aligned and integrated into the plans for a Mars architecture, then these services will be 
programmed to enable a Mars transportation system and will directly impact the life-cycle costs of such a system.  
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An important example of a commercial service is delivery of lunar-derived propellant (LOX/LH2) to a 
propellant depot at a cis-lunar space destination. As was shown in Section II, approximately 50 to 60% of the 
IMLEO needed for a typical Mars transfer vehicle is propellant. Therefore, if propellant at a cost-effective rate can 
be retrieved from a cis-lunar propellant depot than it would reduce the number of heavy-lift launches needed from 
Earth and enable more options for hardware to be accommodated on its scheduled launches. As will be shown in 
Section VIII, an economic assessment of such a strategy proves to be cost-effective to a Mars architecture and 
beneficial to stimulating a cis-lunar economy. 
A.  Phased-Development Approach for a Potential LCOTS Program 
It will be beneficial to develop the LCOTS program in a phased-development approach. This approach will 
allow for incremental development and demonstration of capabilities before committing to the next phase. This is  
also a lower-risk approach since it allows for several off-ramps to the program and time for pause between phases to 
make sure its milestones and objectives are being met before proceeding to the next phase. This approach will also 
allow for a modest funding commitment to initiate Phase I to determine if sufficient industry interest and financial 
investors materialize as planned.   
As discussed previously, the preferred contractual mechanism for entering into partnerships with industry under 
LCOTS will be SAA’s.  A phased-development approach will work very well together with the SAA’s as it will 
allow for well-conceived, achievable milestones in each SAA for each phase.  To further reduce risk to the program, 
it is recommended to include several hardware-demonstration and financial milestones integrated well with the 
schedule development plan to track and demonstrate progress throughout each phase. If milestones are not achieved 
in a timely manner according to plan, then it will provide several opportunities to re-negotiate milestones if 
necessary, and/or terminate partnership agreement if not enough progress is being made. These are all built-in 
mechanisms to the LCOTS program to reduce risk as much as possible to all parties and to ensure that objectives for 
each phase are being met as planned. The following sub-sections describe the proposed objectives for each phase. 
Phase I – Surfaces Resources and Hazards Assessment 
The goal for the first phase of LCOTS is to assess surface resources and hazards data at various lunar sites by 
examining ground truth and reconnaissance data provided by lunar rovers and instrument packages sent to the lunar 
surface. It is important to make these assessment in the initial phase to determine economic viability of extracting 
these resources given the hazards associated with each location. Some of the hazards that may impact economic 
viability include difficult landing conditions, limited sun illumination, rocky or steep terrain, extreme temperature 
environments, limited direct communications to Earth which would inhibit tele-operations of robotic systems. Also, 
the types and quantities of easily-accessible resources may vary from site to site.  
As discussed in Section III, there are a wide variety of resources in the lunar regolith but ground truth data is 
needed to determine the specific amounts and precise locations for these resources before committing significant 
investment funds to begin ISRU operations. Therefore, it is imperative to gather sufficient ground truth data at 
several sites including the lunar poles and along the equator to perform a comparative, economic analysis that will 
lead to an informed decision on the best economical approach for resource extraction before entering the next phase, 
Lunar ISRU demonstration.  
To achieve the goals of Phase I, the following specific objectives are proposed to not only obtain surface 
resources and hazards assessment data but also to demonstrate critical capabilities, such as lunar cargo transportation 
and resource extraction that meet specific requirements, such as, precise landing and energy-efficient resource 
extraction. Successful demonstration of these capabilities and ability to meet the requirements will determine if there 
is enough potential and justification to move on to the second phase of the program.  
Below is the list of Phase I objectives to be met before entering Phase II of the LCOTS program. 
1) Demonstrate capabilities to transport payloads from Earth to Lunar Surface cost effectively. 
2) Prospect several sites for surface resources and hazards data: 
a. Provide ground truth data at various sites including volatiles, water-ice deposits, lunar regolith properties, 
thermal environments, etc. 
b. Assess potential sites for hazards and accessibility, such as, rough terrain, rocky surface, steep hills, etc. 
3)  Demonstrate capabilities for lunar resource extraction and/or potential ISRU operations. 
 
Phase II – Lunar ISRU Demonstration 
The goal for Phase II is to continue maturing and demonstrating capabilities to reduce technical and financial 
risk before entering Phase III which will award long-term services agreement for ISRU production and delivery to 
cis-lunar destinations. The particular type of capabilities to be demonstrated will depend upon the partner’s proposed 
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technical development and business plan for providing commercial services. In general these capabilities may range 
from H2O extraction from the poles to cracking the H2O to produce LOX and LH2. These capabilities must be 
matured enough to demonstrate sufficient reliability, maintainability and affordability to demonstrate the feasibility 
to scale up production and achieve an economically, viable business plan. 
In addition, there may be several capabilities that support an infrastructure needed to enable the commercial 
services, such as, communications and navigation satellites and solar or nuclear power plants. These capabilities 
may be just as important as the ISRU production capabilities to ensure an economical plan. It will be important to 
make a full assessment of the partner’s plans for providing commercial services before reaching agreement on which 
capabilities will need to be demonstrated to reduce risk before proceeding to the next phase.   
The specific objectives in support of the goals of the second phase are listed as follows:  
1) Demonstrate capabilities for ISRU resource production, such as H2O, LOX, LH2, and storage on a pilot 
scale program (1 or 2 mt of resource). 
2) Demonstrate feasibility and economics of scaling up production and capability to store up to several tons of 
resources on lunar surface. 
3) Demonstrate capability to transport large payloads from lunar surface to cis-lunar space (Earth-Moon 
Lagrange points or Lunar Distant Retrograde Orbit) for long-term storage 
 Again, it is recommended that hardware-demonstration and financial milestones be negotiated and included 
in the SAA’s of Phase II to reduce programmatic risk to LCOTS by providing several off-ramps to the program. 
If there are too many high-risk capabilities that need to be demonstrated, Phase II can be further broken down 
into several sub-parts to ensure a realistic, schedule development and budget plan are achieved. 
 
 Phase III – Lunar ISRU Production and Delivery Services 
 The proposed third phase of LCOTS is very analogous to the ISS Commercial Resupply Services program where 
it awarded long-term service agreements to multiple industry partners after successful demonstration of critical 
capabilities specified under COTS. The plan for the third phase of LCOTS will follow this same strategy. After 
successful demonstrations in Phases I and II, the third phase will award long-term service agreements to multiple 
industry partners, if possible, to provide essential services in support of a Mars transportation system, such as in-
space re-fueling services. Therefore, the specific objectives in support of the goals of the third phase are as follows: 
1) NASA awards long-term contract for Lunar ISRU production of H2O or LOX/LH2 on the order of 
several tons per year. 
2) Awards are also made for delivery services to Cis-Lunar Propellant Depot. 
3) Awards are made to multiple commercial providers to reduce risk and enable competition. 
VI. Maturity Assessment of Candidate Capabilities for LCOTS 
 Before initiating an LCOTS program, a careful assessment should be performed to determine the capabilities that 
are at a high technical maturity level to be successfully demonstrated by industry under a COTS-like model. Other 
important factors to consider during this assessment are: 1) number of viable companies with enough technical and 
financial capability and strong interest to pursue LCOTS opportunity; 2) size of potential markets likely to emerge 
within 5 years to attract private investors; 3) level of affordability to fully develop capability within realistic budgets 
from NASA and private capital from industry; 4) strong potential for positive return on investment based on sound 
business plans; and 5) strong potential to reduce technical, cost or operational risk towards a Mars architecture. 
 During the formulation phase of the COTS program in 2005, a similar assessment was carefully performed over 
a 6 to 8 month period to determine industry interest and readiness to demonstrate various capabilities given a 
realistic program budget. In the beginning, there was a strong push for commercial crew capability to be 
demonstrated in the first phase of COTS. However, after careful study and numerous interviews with potential 
industry partners, it was determined that this approach would be burdened with too high technical, cost and safety 
risk to pursue at the time. A more reasonable approach was taken to demonstrate unpressurized and pressurized 
cargo capabilities to ISS for COTS. This approach would still result in essential capabilities needed for ISS 
operations, however, with a much lower technical and financial risk profile. Therefore, the final recommendation to 
the NASA Administrator was to initiate the COTS program to primarily pursue unpressurized and pressurized cargo 
capabilities to meet the cargo requirements of the ISS which turned out to be a very successful program as 
previously discussed. It was only after successful completion of the COTS program that the commercial crew 
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program was initiated with several risk reduction phases initially to mature capability and reduce technical and 
financial risk. 
 Similarly, an LCOTS program should conduct a careful assessment of capabilities to be demonstrated in each of 
its phases to increase likelihood of success for the program. A preliminary assessment was conducted using the 
criteria of Table 4. These criteria were established by the authors from lessons learned and insight gained from first-
hand experience working on the COTS program. This table provides a description of each criteria and a defined 
range for high, medium and low ratings for this assessment. These criteria are important metrics to help decide if a 
capability is ready to be developed and demonstrated using a COTS-like approach or if a more traditional FAR-
based approach is recommended due to the estimated risk. It is also important to consider at this point if the long-
term capability or service should be commercially or government-owned and operated. The advantages and 
disadvantages of these different models should be discussed and carefully weighed before making final decision on 
the capabilities and/or services for a COTS-like demonstration. 
Table 4. Criteria for Assessing LCOTS Capabilities for Phases I and II 
 
 
 After the criteria were set, a list of candidate capabilities was then compiled to meet the objectives of Phase I and 
II. These candidate capabilities were then down-selected to the top capabilities that would greatly benefit from 
development within a commercial space partnership. Figure 5 provides a list of these top capabilities which are 
divided between Phases I and II as shown in the figure. This figure also shows the preliminary assessments for each 
capability measured against the corresponding criteria as distinguished by the high, medium, and low colored boxes. 
 To enable these assessments, it was important to gather information on the viable companies from the emerging 
space industry showing strong interest in developing cis-lunar capabilities. In recent years, there have emerged a 
growing number of these companies that with business plans to conduct operations and provide services in the 
vicinity or surface of the Moon. These companies are listed in Table 5. The data in this table was obtained from 
public websites and publically available sources. The companies listed in this table are a representative list and not 
meant to be exhaustive. In the follow-up work to this study, this list will be updated from interviews and further 
research into these companies. Companies not on this list are encouraged to contact the authors to participate in this 
analysis.  
Criteria Description Hi/Med/Lo Definitions 
Industry Maturity/Capability Readiness or maturity level of industry capability 
to perform successfully in an operational space 
environment. 
High – TRL 6 or above 
Med – TRL 4 or 5 
Low – TRL 3 and below 
Viable Companies Number of viable companies that exemplify 
strong financial and technical capabilities and 
ability to raise significant investment funds for 
proposed capability demonstration. 
High – 3 or more companies 
Med – 1 or 2 companies 
Low - 0 
Significant Market Measure of potential for emergence of near-term 
markets (within 5 years) beyond NASA's needs 
to enable cost sharing (private financing) and 
cost-effective pricing. 
High – Over $500M markets in 
next 5 years 
Med – Between $100M to 
$500M markets in next 5 years 
Low – Emergence of markets in 
over 5 years 
Positive Return on Investment 
(ROI) 
Measure of potential for positive ROI includes 
level of affordability to fully develop capability, 
proposed price point for capability and overall 
business plan to achieve ROI. 
High – proposed business plans 
are sound and reasonable 
Med – proposed price points are 
achievable 
Low – no evidence of credible 
business plan or price point 
Risk Reduction for Mars Measure of potential to reduce technical, 
operational or cost risk for capability that may be 
a critical element of a Mars architecture.  
 
High – 80% or greater likelihood 
that capability will reduce risk 
Mars missions 
Med – 40 - 80% likelihood 
Low – less than 40% 
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Figure 5. Preliminary Assessment of Potential Capability Candidates for LCOTS 
  
 
Table 5. List of Emerging Space Companies and their prospective Business Plans 
Emerging Space Companies Business Strategy 
Astrobotic Technology Low-cost lunar transportation and rovers to the 
surface of the Moon; delivery of lunar payloads on 
routine basis. 
Moon Express Low-cost robotic missions to the Moon for mining  
resources. 
Masten Space Systems Vertical Take-Off and Vertical-Landing Rockets; 
Lunar Landers 
Bigelow Aerospace LEO space habitats and lunar habitats 
Shackleton Energy Resource prospecting missions to the Moon. Space-
based solar power. 
Deep Space Industries Launch of cubesats to scout near-Earth asteroids 
Planetary Resources LEO-based telescope to identify and characterize 
asteroids for mining potential. 
Golden Spike Crew transportation to the Moon and return. 
 
Capability-Description 
Industry 
Capability/ 
Maturity 
Viable 
Companies 
Significant Market 
Beyond NASA 
Potential for 
Positive ROI 
Risk Reduction 
for Mars 
Lunar Landers – Delivers 
payload < 1 mt to surface 
Lunar Rovers  - small rovers 
for traversing distances up to 
50 km 
Instrument package– for 
prospecting resources and 
identifying hazards 
ISRU Demo- H2O or other 
resources extraction 
Comm and Navigation 
Satellites – to enable large-
scale ISRU operations  
Solar or Nuclear Power 
Stations – for sunlit or dark 
operations 
Pilot-Scale ISRU 
Production – to produce 1 or 
2 mt of H2O or LOX/LH2 
Reusable Lunar Landers – 
to deliver large payloads to 
propellant depot 
Propellant Depot in Cis-
Lunar Space – to store 
several tons of H2O or prop 
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 From Figure 5, the top 2 capabilities that emerged with mostly high ratings were lunar landers and lunar rovers. 
These 2 capabilities scored very high because of the number of companies showing strong interest, economical 
business plans and amount of private investments raised so far. The top 3 companies in this category are listed in 
Table 5. All 3 of these companies are also participating in NASA’s Lunar Cargo Transportation and Landing by Soft 
Touchdown (CATALYST) Program sponsored by HEOMD which were awarded un-funded Space Act Agreements 
in 2014 to develop lunar transportation systems. The purpose of the Lunar CATALYST program is to encourage the 
development of robotic lunar landers that can be integrated with commercial launch vehicles to deliver payloads to 
the lunar surface. 
  The other 2 capabilities listed for Phase I, instrument package and ISRU demonstration, should probably be 
delivered by NASA since there is more experience and technical capability to develop these capabilities within 
NASA at this time than industry. However, before making final decisions for Phase I, it is recommended that a more 
detailed assessment be made for the top capabilities of Phase I to more precisely evaluate maturity level, 
affordability, business plans including markets and potential for positive ROI. All these factors are very important to 
estimate likelihood of success to demonstrate capability for a given schedule and budget. 
 For Phase II, the assessments of Figure 5 show that communications and navigation satellites, and solar or 
nuclear power stations scored mostly high against the criteria. It is very clear that these capabilities are much needed 
to support any commercial or government-owned operation on the lunar surface. Furthermore, it could be debated 
that these candidate capabilities should be moved into Phase I instead of delaying development until Phase II.  As 
with most programs, the deciding factor will be the budget limitations for each phase. However, given the goals of 
Phase I to prospect for resources and identify hazards on the lunar surface, the top 2 capabilities, lunar landers and 
rovers, should be given top priority for Phase I since you first need to identify the most economical sites for lunar 
extraction of resources before setting up your power stations and navigation satellites. 
 The bottom 2 capabilities of Figure 5, reusable lunar landers and propellant depot in cis-lunar space, scored very 
low in this preliminary assessment. This shows that these capabilities are not ready to be demonstrated by industry at 
this time. It is recommended that technologies enabling these capabilities, such as cryogenic zero-boiloff and 
propellant transfer, continue to be matured within NASA. 
VII. Implementation Options for LCOTS Phases I and II 
 To initiate Phase I of LCOTS, three options are presented to meet the goals and objectives of Phase I and 
develop the top capabilities recommended from the preliminary assessments described in the previous section. In 
addition, an option for Phase II is also presented in the section below. 
A.   Phase I - Option 1 
  To meet the objectives of Phase I, multiple landers and rovers will be needed to prospect for resources, 
identify hazards and  determine the most economical and beneficial site for extracting resources on the surface of the 
Moon. A low-cost approach to obtaining surfaces resources and hazards data would be to take advantage of the 
progress already made by the commercial space industry who are in current pursuit of Google Lunar X-Prize.  
This X-Prize was initiated in 2007 by Google “to incentivize space entrepreneurs to create a new era of 
affordable access to the Moon and beyond” as stated on their websitevi. The competition offers $30M in prizes 
including $20M Grand Prize to the first team that successfully lands on the Moon, traverses 500 meters and  
transmits high definition images and video back to Earth. Although the teams must use mainly private funds (90%) 
to develop their systems, the guidelines do allow for government to provide or purchase services from the teams at 
fair market value.  
Following these guidelines, a low-cost option for NASA to obtain ground truth data is to purchase payload 
delivery services from one or more of the teams to deliver a government-furnished instrumentation payload to a 
desired lunar site. This instrumentation payload could be competed within NASA or selected from external 
organizations. One option for this payload may be the RESOLVE instrumentation suite which is being developed for 
NASA’s RPM project as discussed earlier in Section III. The RESOLVE payload includes such instruments as a 
neutron spectrometer system, near-infrared volatiles spectrometer system and lunar advanced volatile analysis to 
prospect for resources and oxygen & volatile extraction node to demonstrate ISRU capability. This instrumentation 
suite can be adjusted and/or distributed to fit on one or more of the lunar X-Prize landers and rovers. Also, since 
RPM is planned to launch some time in 2019, the Lunar X-Prize flights would complement this mission by 
delivering reproductions of these mature instruments on additional rovers at various lunar sites. 
                                                          
vi http://lunar.xprize.org/about/overview 
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In addition, penetrators or probes similar to those flown on Deep Space 2 mission27 may also be released from 
the landers to penetrate beneath the lunar surface and provide measurements of the volatile concentrations at various 
sites as well. Together, these instruments and flight platforms can serve to accomplish the goals and objectives of 
Phase I in partnership with commercial space providers at a reasonable and affordable cost to the government. 
Table 6 below summarizes the resources needed for this Lunar Payload Delivery Services option. For this 
option, it is assumed that a medium-size launch vehicle, such as, Falcon 9 or Atlas V rocket would be sufficient to 
deliver a rover with instrumentation suite. The estimated mass of the instrumentation suite and rover may reach up 
to 270 kg. As shown in Table 6, the total estimated cost ranges from $50M to $100M. The range in costs vary 
depending on the partnership agreement between LCOTS partners (NASA and Lunar X-Prize team) to share cost 
and risk to develop lunar transportation capability. 
The basis for these estimates was the data obtained from one of the Lunar X-Prize teams, Astrobotics. Their 
payload user guide28 claims their Griffin lunar lander can deliver up to 270 kg to the lunar surface from a Falcon 9 
launch starting at $1.2M/kg. If NASA takes advantage of the first Lunar X-prize flight, then the lander and rover 
systems will be furnished by the Lunar X-prize teams. This is a very low-cost approach, however, higher risk is 
being taken since it will be the initial flight for one of the teams. 
Table 6. Option 1 – Lunar Payload Delivery Services 
 
B.   Phase I - Option 2: Prospecting and ISRU Demonstration 
 As a second option, a heavy-class, launch vehicle, such as Falcon Heavy or ULA’s Vulcan rocket, is 
recommended to be used in partnership with the Google Lunar X-Prize teams to deliver multiple payloads to 
multiple sites on a single launch. Although this option is at higher cost, it is more advantageous because it offers 
multiple opportunities to obtain ground truth data in a shorter amount of time than Option 1. This strategy also 
lowers the risk of mission success by flying multiple missions at once, provided that there is a second set of units for 
each lander and a backup flight opportunity to protect against a launch failure. The strategy is especially effective 
for risk reduction and site optimization in the event that the first set is successfully flown and five additional sites 
are subsequently characterized with the back-up set of hardware.   
Although neither the Falcon Heavy nor ULA’s Vulcan have launched yet, they are estimated to be operational by 
2016 and 2019, respectively. As projected by SpaceX, Falcon Heavy will have payload capability up to 53 mt to 
LEO at cost-effective pricing of $1700/kg as cited on their websitevii. Additionally, as reported in the ELA study of 
reference 11, it is estimated that a single launch of Falcon Heavy can deliver up to 5 lander/rover systems to 
probable sites near the lunar poles and equator to prospect for resources.  
Since ULA’s Vulcan rocket was recently announced, there was not sufficient data at the time to conduct similar 
analysis on this system. However, it is expected that it’s powerful upper-stage Advanced Cryogenic Evolved Stage 
(ACES) “will have greater capability than any other rocket on the market” as cited on their websiteviii. 
For this option, it is proposed that the instruments for prospecting and ISRU demonstration equipment be 
competed and supplied by commercial industry or government-furnished equipment (GFE) as in Option 1. If there is 
                                                          
vii http://www.spacex.com/about/capabilities 
viii http://www.ulalaunch.com/Products_Vulcan.aspx 
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enough lead time for this option, there may be sufficient interest from industry to build and test their prospecting and 
ISRU instrumentation and equipment. This may prove to be a cost-effective approach since some companies have 
expressed strong interest in extracting resources from the lunar surface to fit within their business plans as shown in 
Table 5. Table 7 below summarizes the resources, requirements and approximate range of costs for this Prospecting 
and ISRU demonstrations. The potential sources listed in this table are meant to be representative and not an 
exhaustive list. In the forward work, a more comprehensive list will be sought for all the options. In addition, the 
range in costs vary depending on the partnership agreement between LCOTS partners as mentioned previously to 
share cost and risk to develop prospecting and ISRU capabilities. 
Table 7. Option 2 – Prospecting and ISRU Demonstrations 
 
C.   Phase I - Option 3 
 A third and final option for Phase I will also demonstrate lunar cargo transportation and ISRU capability. 
However, this option does not take advantage of the Google Lunar X-Prize competition for several reasons, such as, 
the competition is completed before Phase I is underway. Presently the Lunar X-Prize deadline for winning the 
Grand Prize is December 31, 2017.  
In this scenario, a heavy-class launch vehicle, similar to option 2, is used to deliver several landers and rovers 
(up to 5) to the lunar surface. However since the competition is not leveraged, the estimated costs significantly 
increase compared to option 2 because the costs for the landers and rovers will have to be added into this option 
which was excluded from option 2. Depending on when this option is initiated, the costs for the landers and rovers 
will need to be negotiated with the viable suppliers at the time.  Also this option will also offer the opportunity for 
industry demonstration of instruments and ISRU equipment through an LCOTS partnership agreement as previously 
discussed. Although this third option is offered here as a viable option, more work will be needed to fully develop 
this option and provide a fair estimate of costs.  
D. Phase II Option for Pilot-Scale H2O Extraction Demonstration 
To meet the goals and objectives of Phase 2, an option for a pilot-scale demonstration of H2O extraction is 
presented in Table 8. This option allows for demonstration of robotic operations of ISRU equipment to extract H2O 
from water-ice deposits at the poles, then process and store the water up to 1 to 2 mt. This pilot-scale operation will 
demonstrate all steps necessary for full-scale H2O extraction operation which is necessary to determine feasibility 
and economics of a full-scale operation. 
Table 8 includes several assumptions for this option. It assumes that only 1 heavy-lift launch is necessary to 
deliver the excavator/hauler (up to 1 mt) and the H2O processor and storage tank (up to 1 mt). It also assumes power 
stations, such as solar or nuclear power stations, have been set up near the pilot-scale demonstration site and offer 
the necessary power demands of the ISRU operations. It also assumes communications and navigation satellites 
have been put in place for polar operations which allow for direct communication to Earth during all robotic 
operations. 
Also the basis of estimate used for Table 8 range of costs were derived from cost estimates provided in the ELA 
study11 and Spudis/Lavoie13 conference paper. These studies examined architectures to develop ISRU operational 
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plants on the lunar surface capable of delivering up to 200 mt of propellant (LOX/LH2) on a yearly basis to cis-lunar 
space destinations.  
The total estimated cost in Table 8 were approximated based on these full-scale operations and expenses but 
scaled down proportionately to produce 1 to 2 mt of water. Follow-on work is needed to further refine these 
estimates and identify a complete list of potential companies that can develop these capabilities and meet the full 
criteria of Table 4 as previously discussed. It should also be noted that if other lunar industries emerge in the next 5 
years, then there will be a significant market for the production of water which will further drive down costs. 
Finally, there are many other possible options that can meet the goals and objectives of Phase II. Only one option 
is presented here to show order of magnitude costs for completing Phase II. A more feasible option can be 
developed after Phase I is underway to more accurately determine industry capability, investment opportunities and 
emerging markets which will all have an impact on estimated costs and timeline. 
Table 8. Phase 2 Option Estimated Expenses 
 
VIII. Economic Assessment of Lunar Propellant for Mars Mission 
Economic assessments of the proposition of lunar propellant for human Mars missions conducted via business 
cases and/or NASA budget analysis often mixes private and public funds according to approach. A “what-if” 
business case analysis may involve NASA paying for most or all up-front costs29. While major cost elements for 
developing and establishing a lunar ISRU capability, such as, ISRU plant, propellant depot, etc, may appear 
manageable, establishing the capability as a whole can amount to some tens of billions of dollars11,13 –especially if 
including human tending as these architectures recommend. As an example, the recent ELA study resulted in 
estimated costs of $40B over a 10-12 year period to establish a permanent commercial lunar base that can create and 
deliver up to 200 mt of propellant per year to cis-lunar space. Although this may appear as a fairly high investment, 
a fair economic assessment should also estimate the potential revenue stream against operational costs as well as 
other economic benefits. 
Once operational, a revenue stream sensitivity is often assessed around some price per kg. A revenue of $10,000 
per kg has been considered as a price NASA might pay for propellant since “the value of fuel for a single Mars 
mission may be several billion dollars by itself”30. Combined with Mars mission needs of 650 mt of propellant or 
more as discussed in Section II, it becomes evident that there is a potential multi-billion dollar a year revenue 
opportunity. 
Approaching the business case viability for lunar propellant can be seen in simpler terms as the process by which 
an effort on Earth, and a related space activity or interim outcome, is converted finally into delivered propellant. 
Assuming the propellant is some total kg per year of LOX and LH2, and focusing on the narrow “anchor” customer 
being NASA, provided that propellant at an interface, the question becomes how possible is it that efforts which cost 
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some $/kg get converted to delivered propellant at another $/kg? This simplification requires understanding the 
initial efforts on a $/kg basis before these translate into the final product - delivered propellant. 
Two key factors that bound the question of turning an effort at some cost into propellant sellable at a price that is 
higher, adding value to something less expensive than the going price of the finished product, are: an ISRU 
capabilities autonomy and life limits. To the degree the autonomy of an ISRU operation is high or low, or the life of 
the in-space infrastructure is high or low, a higher or lower degree of human-tended activity gets integrated into the 
business equation as a cost. 
At one extreme, permanent human tending entails permanent cargo support, habitation, and so on, adding further 
costs into a lunar propellant business equation. At the other extreme, little or no human tending for propellant 
production through delivery will have recurring costs driven by the effort to manage, operate and maintain assets 
such as an ISRU plant/system, reusable landers as tankers, and the depot in lunar orbit, via tele-operation from 
Earth. 
The value to this simplification, of thinking in terms of an effort (cost) converted into propellant (product), is in 
seeing that an ISRU operation on the Moon can be bounded by the contributions of lower or higher cost efforts 
which themselves have a cost/kg basis. Knowing that in-space crew activity is a cost at well over $10,000/kg (a sum 
total of launcher, spacecraft, etc.) even in the best case today31, it would not be possible to have such a cost dominate 
in a business case pretending to convert such activity into a product sold at only $10,000/kg. This is the allure of 
LEO depots32, taking launchers and tanker stages at costs less than the $10,000/kg propellant price point. Converting 
a $2,000 to $5,000/kg costix (launcher payload, tankers, ops) into a $10,000/kg final product has immediate appeal. 
For a similar propellant delivery concept, but via a depot in cis-lunar space, serviced from a plant on the lunar 
surface, there is additional potential for needing human tending, not just at the depot in space, but at the facilities on 
the Moon. Figure 6 compares revenue rates (black dashed lines) versus costs at different rates depending on the level 
of autonomy and human tending. A more autonomous system will presumably require less human tending and result 
in lower cost as indicated by the green line in the figure (cost of $6500/kg which was scaled appropriately based on 
the ELA study11). Hence, the business case may or may not close depending on the amount of human tending 
needed. For a modest level of automation, an ISRU lunar propellant operation that requires occasional human 
tending can close its business case (green line) - if the expensive human tending cost does not overwhelm converting 
other less expensive costs (efforts) into a total product at less than its selling price point ($10,000/kg or as the case 
may be). 
 
 
Figure 6. Degrees of autonomy and life limits in propellant production and delivery. These degrees entail more 
or less crew and related support in determining the business case for lunar propellant for NASA’s Mars missions. 
                                                          
ix A Falcon 9, consisting of rocket stages and rocket engines, already launches payloads commercially at a cost per usable 
payload of approximate $5,000 per kg. If stages and engines and their effort and systems (flight and ground) can already be sold 
profitably at this rate, an additional stage acting as a propellant tanker would by extension be possible at a similar rate. Although 
cumulative, a scale at the Falcon Heavy end, potentially at $2,000/kg, with the additional tanker atop, would easily accumulate no 
more than $4,000/kg in costs for propellant. 
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Alternately, a lunar crew for other purposes, not entirely attributable and dedicated to the ISRU operation, would 
advance the lunar ISRU case even further – amortizing into the ISRU business case only some portion of this cost. 
Similarly, according to life limits, infrastructure that is tended to at one rate but used over some other Mars mission 
rate, might advance the business case by amortizing infrastructure operating costs over a number of Mars missions. 
Additional amortization of any given costs could occur through productivity – assuming a ready customer for 
more propellant and that costs continue to be bounded by the basic parameters described previously. Additional 
revenue against a given cost could arise from many emerging or potential markets as outlined in other studies33. 
Although the market projections in this USC study are preliminary, it emphasizes the importance of maturing such 
market studies to better estimate potential services and annual income from capabilities developed on the Moon. 
Therefore development costs for ISRU and propellant production on the Moon for Mars missions should be seen 
in balance against its many economic and other benefits. The direct potential economic benefits of lunar ISRU 
capability are lower life-cycle costs to human Mars missions relative to other options as previously discussed in 
earlier sections. Other economic benefits may include new revenue streams from new lunar industries, such as, lunar 
mining, solar power satellites and lunar tourism as discussed in the USC study, reference 33.  
Economic efficiency has already been shown in the ELA study of reference 11, whereby capability and 
infrastructure that is formed around a commercial partnership approach can reduce the costs of the lunar ISRU and 
lunar depot propellant to levels that are more affordable within the context of NASA budget constraints. Economic 
efficiency measured by extensibility, the ability of a NASA initiative to create wholly new industries serving non-
government markets, also furthers other economic goals. Economic growth that is more visible will be able to justify 
and sustain further NASA investment. Also, market growth beyond NASA would enable products and services that 
NASA needs for Mars missions at reduced costs to the degree non-government markets provide private investment, 
maturation of technology, and the opportunity to amortize private business cases over more users. 
Performance efficiency as a benefit has also been shown as a possibility using metrics such as IMLEO. 
Considering a lunar ISRU plant and its tankers and orbital depot capabilities as masses that can be traded against the 
mass of the propellant required for the same Mars mission, significantly less mass (up to a 48% IMLEO reduction)34 
may result from the lunar ISRU route.  
Additionally, a lunar ISRU capability would certainly result in technical and operational risk reduction for a 
future human Mars mission. There would be several technologies and operations matured through this process that 
would directly benefit a Mars mission, such as, autonomous ISRU operations, tele-operation of robotic systems, 
long-lasting life support systems, extended crew operations, and surface habitats. 
All these benefits should be weighted carefully against the up-front investments needed for a lunar ISRU plant 
versus an Earth-delivered propellant depot. In addition, the ISRU plant and all related capability (the orbital depot, 
tankers, etc.) can be seen as competing with 650 mt or more of propellant, but with the possibility that any emplaced 
lunar infrastructure can be amortized across multiple missions and other lunar industries whereas propellant 
delivered from Earth would be fixed requirement for every mission. The ISRU plant, tankers, etc. are in effect 
reusable propellant - in this sense. As with the price points, economic efficiency and performance efficiency are 
highly dependent on the degree of autonomy of the ISRU capability. Any mass of crew, their cargo, spare parts, or 
repair and replacement activities reduces the opportunity for the ISRU capability to compete on economics or 
performance against propellant tonnage costs in the case of all the propellant from Earth or at some other point 
(LEO depots). 
Lastly, the costs and the price points for propellant are consistent with the advances in costs that have already 
been estimated using commercial acquisition approaches in NASA. Were NASA to apply a COTS-like acquisition 
approach beyond the launch vehicles or spacecraft (crew or cargo) to date, to other space systems (ISRU, lunar 
landers, orbital depots, etc.), the process incentives and characteristics open the door to the potential affordability 
improvements as was discussed earlier. In either case, even with the uncertainties of a COTS-like approach, 
traditional alternatives (cost-plus, etc.) carry the potential for costs so many times higher as to close the door to any 
human Mars missions at all given NASA’s budgetary constraints. 
IX. Concluding Remarks 
In accordance with the ultimate goal for NASA of sending humans to the surface of Mars, an economical and 
sustainable approach to achieving this goal was discussed and several recommendations were made. The key 
elements for this approach included 1)leveraging international and commercial participation as much as possible; 2) 
learning to “live off the land” and developing ISRU capabilities to take advantage of resources existent on other 
worlds; 3) showing value and economic benefit to important stakeholders and the public to maintain financial 
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support and achieve sustainability; 4) using Cis-Lunar space as a nearby testbed for maturing and demonstrating 
capabilities that will be essential for future Mars transportation systems and 5) creating a thriving Cis-Lunar 
economy to support and sustain future human missions to Mars.  
To address all these elements, the authors recommended to initiate an LCOTS program using a COTS-like model 
that was established in 2005-06. The proposed LCOTS program as described, plans for NASA to enter into 
commercial space partnerships via Space Act Agreements with industry to demonstrate cost-effective, cis-lunar 
commercial services. These services may range from lunar transportation, to lunar ISRU operations, and cis-lunar 
propellant depots. Similar to the original COTS program, the goals of the LCOTS program will be to: 1) reduce 
development and operational costs by sharing costs with industry; 2) create new markets in cis-lunar space to further 
reduce operational costs; and 3) enable NASA to develop an affordable and economical exploration architecture.  
A phased-development approach was also recommended to allow for incremental development and 
demonstration of capabilities. This approach was presented as a lower-risk approach since it allows for several off-
ramps throughout the program and time for pause between phases to make sure its milestones and objectives are 
being met before proceeding to the next phase. The goals and objectives for each phase were presented along with 
options to initiate each phase.   
Finally, an economic, business case was presented to assess viability of a business plan to produce lunar-derived 
propellant for a Mars transportation system. It was shown that for a propellant price point of $10K/kg, it was 
feasible to close the business case for operating costs in the range of $6500/kg using autonomous operations with 
limited human tending. These estimates were based on a recent report from the ELA study11 to build and operate 
ISRU facilities on the surface of the Moon. This study resulted in estimated costs of $40B over a 10-12 year period 
to establish a permanent commercial lunar base that can create and deliver up to 200 mt of propellant per year to cis-
lunar space. In addition, potential economic, performance and risk reduction benefits were described for a lunar 
ISRU plant that could benefit not only future human missions to Mars but to the emergence of cis-lunar industries as 
well. 
Follow-on work was also recommended to continue evaluating the maturity of cis-lunar capabilities and 
technical and financial viability of emerging space companies before entering into commercial space partnerships 
for development and demonstration. Other key follow-on work included maturing the implementation options for 
each phase to meet program’s schedule and budget constraints and continued work on the economic assessment of 
lunar-derived propellant for Mars missions including performing market studies to better predict the feasibility and 
likelihood of new cis-lunar industries. 
In conclusion, it is recommended that a potential LCOTS program continue to be investigated to define a 
program plan that pursues a low-risk approach and yields the highest value and benefits towards reaching our 
ultimate goal of settling humans on Mars. As preliminary findings have indicated, a future LCOTS program has the 
great potential of enabling development of cost-effective, commercial capabilities and establishing a thriving cis-
lunar economy which will lead the way to an economical and sustainable approach for future human missions to 
Mars. 
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